A critical analysis of Richard Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene, exploring whether his theory of kin selection can fully explain evolutionary behavior.

 

Introduction

Richard Dawkins’ 1976 publication of The Selfish Gene introduced a new paradigm to biology about the nature of genes. His theory is as simple as the title suggests: “The primary goal of genes is to prosper (dominance in the gene pool), and this explains the selfish, exclusionary behavior of individuals.” Most people who first encounter Dawkins’ theory will question it, citing counter-examples of altruistic behavior. However, Dawkins uses the mechanisms behind these altruistic behaviors to explore the source of genetic selfishness. Forty years later, advances in science have exposed many of the argumentative fallacies in Dawkins’ account. The most notable of these is Dawkins’ theory of kin selection. Dawkins provides a fairly plausible explanation for altruism among individuals who share genes by using the nearness of genes. This is a measure of how much genes are shared between individuals, and he uses it to explain kinship behavior. However, Dawkins’ explanation of kinship selection is incomplete, with many inconsistencies and counterexamples. In response, Dawkins evades explanation without clarification or acknowledgment of his incompleteness. In this blog post, I will supplement Dawkins’ explanation with environmental determinism.

 

Dawkins’ kin selection theory and its problems

In his explanation of kin selection, Dawkins states his premise (genes try to leave as many copies as possible). When it comes to kinship (between individuals who share one or more genes), Dawkins talks about genes as if they behave purely computationally. Here’s how they calculate the genetic plausibility of their own behavior When an individual performs an action, add up the gains and losses of that action, and add up the total. This is called the net benefit score, and the individual will act in the direction of the largest net benefit score. If the individual is not related, the benefit or harm of the behavior to individuals other than itself is calculated as zero. Dawkins notes at the end that his explanations may be uncertain, leaving open the possibility that they are based on estimates and experience, as he mentions the certainty of nearness and the life expectancy of individuals. Dawkins also brings certainty and accuracy into the discussion of kinship selection by comparing the animals’ estimates of their age with those of naturalists, concluding that the “true” age of the animals is not as important as they thought it was.
However, there are many problems with Dawkins’ theory of kinship selection. First, it uses too few variables (age, certainty, and life expectancy). Second, he doesn’t provide a systematic and logical explanation for the counterexamples. First, the explanation of kin selection based on nearness is wrong. The calculation of nearness is too simple. It simply uses the generation gap and doesn’t take into account mutations or other genetic effects (early in development). This means that you don’t know how much of your gene is in another individual, so you can’t act accordingly. It also raises questions about certainty. How would individuals with shared genes actually recognize each other if they were separated and hadn’t seen each other in a long time? Of course, humans have a concept of genealogy, but other animals don’t, so they wouldn’t recognize each other.
For example, if there are parents and children, Dawkins’ theory of kin selection can explain why parents are good to their children, but how can it explain why children are good to their parents? Children often sacrifice themselves to help their parents, even though they have no genes to pass on to them and their parents have a lower life expectancy than they do. This is not unique to humans, and Dawkins’ theory of kin selection does not explain these situations. Dawkins also fails to answer many counterexamples. An example is the turtle egg, which can be considered from the perspective of the parent and the fake child. From the parent’s point of view, the ability to accurately identify their own eggs from those of others would be necessary for genetic prosperity. However, if this mechanism is not properly developed, the egg will be deceived until it awakens. This is a great genetic loss, and it can be said that genes are not capable of organized kin selfishness.
On the other hand, from the perspective of the offspring (and the actual parent), having a child lay eggs in the wrong nest is a loss compared to raising them yourself, given the possibility of the eggs breaking. Even if the number of offspring is large, laying an egg is a sacrifice of one’s own offspring to an uncertain entity (the offspring), and thus a failure to be selfish. This phenomenon is a counterexample to Dawkins’s theory of kin selection, which he fails to recognize and insensitively dismisses. Other examples include moral behavior, which, even if limited to humans, requires logical proof, rather than avoiding the answer by using the word “society,” even if social pressures and education exist for humans. It is unclear how traveling to Africa to volunteer (assuming there is no benefit) would benefit one’s own genetic prosperity.

 

Complementing kin selection

Above, we’ve identified the problems with Dawkins’ theory of kin selection. It shows that we can’t simply rely on kinship alone to explain an individual’s behavior. The environment in which an individual lives must also be added to the theory of kin selection in order to address some of its incompleteness. An individual’s behavior is a combination of both kinship and environmental factors. For example, an imprinted person who believes they are a parent, even though they are not related to them, is more influenced by the environment in which they were born than by their genes. In humans, adoption is also impossible to explain solely by blood. Adopted children and their parents don’t share a single drop of blood, yet many parents do everything they can for their adopted children. It’s their love for the child, not their genes. These behaviors vary from person to person, from individual to individual, and are so hard to quantify that they cannot be calculated. Dawkins would have to accept that there are environmental factors that cannot be calculated into existing theories. In other words, Dawkins can stick to his theory if there are no environmental influences, but if there are any, he will have to accept them.
Furthermore, more research is needed to understand how environmental factors affect genetic behavior. For example, differences in parenting behavior or social structure in different animal species could be studied to understand how environmental factors affect the behavior of genes. This would complement Dawkins’ theory and contribute to a more comprehensive explanation. Furthermore, the complex moral behaviors and social norms in human societies can also be explained by the interaction between environment and genes.

 

Conclusion

In the previous section, we reviewed Dawkins’ theory and how it fits into kin selection, listed the problems with his theory (math accuracy, environmental factors), and provided counterexamples of the problems (e.g., fertility, adoption, imprinting). From this, we can conclude that Dawkins needs to account for the influence of the environment in his theory. We were unable to quantify the influence of the environment, but creative follow-up research may be able to explain the unified theory of behavior through quantification. While Dawkins’ theory remains an important foundation for biological research, it is important to recognize that it is not the only way to explain evolutionary behavior. Future research will complement Dawkins’ theory and contribute to building a more comprehensive and accurate theory of evolutionary behavior.